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ABSTRACT  
 
Academic legal education is traditionally mostly concerned with the reproduction of 
knowledge and applying it to specific, narrowly-defined cases. The ability to 
mechanically apply law to facts, however, is rapidly becoming obsolete in our 
modern world. The digitalised society of today calls for an academically educated 
lawyer with a different mindset and higher-order thinking skills. 
We therefore ran a pilot project in two courses with the objective of enabling 
students to develop higher-order thinking skills such as categorised by Bloom’s 
taxonomy. The changes we implemented are loosely based on Dochy’s HILL-model. 
In this paper, we discuss these changes, their implementation and their results in 
greater detail.  
Evaluations of the pilot project show that student engagement and interest in the 
subject matter have increased, leading to more self-study hours being integrated into 
the course. This allowed us to devote more time to practicing the desired skills and 
increasing test difficulty accordingly. However, some questions and challenges 
remain. 
 
 
 
 
ACADEMIC LEGAL EDUCATION – DESIRE FOR CHANGE 
 
Traditionally, the legal discipline has found itself in a somewhat awkward position 
in academic circles. Some question whether legal studies are, in fact, academic at all 
(e.g. Stolker 2011). The reason for this is – in a nutshell – that the law is very much 
society-dependent. The law is, simultaneously, a reflection of societal norms, a 
policy instrument, and a technique for organising societal conduct. It is also 
inherently subjective. Compared to more ‘traditional’ academic disciplines (such as 
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those in the STEM fields), the law lacks a ‘higher truth’ that can be measured or 
otherwise pursued in any meaningful way. Instead, the ‘right’ answer to a legal 
question depends on the legal system under which the answer is to be sought. Any 
answer to a legal question is based on arguments drawing from legislation, 
precedent, and (personal and societal) preferences, each of which can in turn be 
founded on a plethora of arguments (fairness, efficiency, tradition, predictability, 
ease of use, etc.). Different legal experts can (validly) have widely differing opinions 
of what the right answer to a difficult legal issue is, depending on their societal views 
and their perception of (the rationale of) the law on a given subject. Since the right 
answer to a legal question is the result of consensus girded by underlying societal 
norms, this answer may evolve along with the society that forms the legal norms that 
are used for answering it. 
 
As multifaceted as the law is, so is – at least in theory – legal education. In an ideal 
world, at the end of their studies, students should be able to not only apply the law 
in a given situation, but also reflect on the norms underlying the law and the legal 
system that is used to provide the answers sought. This requires higher-order 
thinking skills as categorised by Bloom (1956). In practice, however, much of legal 
education in the Netherlands is geared towards the first of these skills: applying the 
law to a set of facts. For many students, this mode of thinking about legal issues 
suffices; it allows them to enter legal practice, where they spend most of their time 
resolving legal questions in a similar manner. For legal educators, this ‘practical’ 
approach to the law offers short-term benefits. Offering courses geared towards 
mechanical application of (existing) law to fact-patterns commonly found in legal 
practice allows them to claim the relevance of their subjects for any students 
interested in such a career path. It also allows them to simplify their own workloads, 
because they can select fact patterns that do, in fact, have a ‘right’ (mostly 
undisputed) answer. This makes for easier grading and teaching. Instead of having 
to explore every possible angle of a question, one can simply explain how the 
relevant legal norms and case law lead to the conclusion sought. An additional 
‘benefit’ is that any underlying societal issues can be avoided in most cases. Instead 
of debating whether a certain answer ought to be right, the debate is restricted to 
whether that answer follows from existing legislation and case law. Finally, and most 
mundanely, teaching courses in such a manner is simply cheaper. The less discussion 
and debate between students is required, the more students can be placed in seminar 
groups together.  
 
In practice, therefore, seminar lecturers are confronted with large groups of students 
who are mostly interested in learning the correct legal provisions to apply to the fact-
patterns that they are asked to solve during their exams. Because seminars are geared 
towards preparation for the exam, lecturers use their seminar time not for discussion, 
but to explain the law, often in the form of a mini lecture. After the legal provisions 
and the steps in which they are to be applied have been covered, little time is often 
left to discuss more elementary matters. In addition, the introduction of the internet 
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and social media has made it easier than ever before for students to share and copy 
answers to the homework assignments (as these can largely be found online), leading 
to student disengagement and reduced incentive to study the materials for 
themselves. Students are therefore less engaged in their courses, leading to a lower 
retention of study materials.  
 
The above (somewhat over-generalised) current state of academic legal education is 
problematic for at least two reasons. The first is that the mechanical application of 
law to facts can hardly be called academic. As a result of the expectations lecturers 
have of their students and the way in which students meet these expectations, legal 
education has become more and more practice-oriented. It is focused on 
remembering, understanding and applying the law instead of being able to analyse 
and evaluate existing law or even propose new law. Students’ skill sets are, in other 
words, single-issue: they memorise answers to certain fact-patterns, but are not 
necessarily able to devise answers of their own to related fact-patterns. They lack a 
more general understanding of (the function of) the law, the capacity to find 
similarities and distinctions between cases, and the ability to give expression to the 
law’s underlying personal and societal preferences, each of which would allow them 
to imagine new solutions to new problems. The fact that legal education itself has 
become less academic is not a concern for most students; as long as they go into 
practice after leaving university, they do not have to compete for research grants or 
face governmental visitation committees. However, for the students who are 
interested in deepening their understanding of their field of studies (and perhaps go 
into legal research later in their careers), it can be quite frustrating to be tasked with 
rather mundane assignments that do not allow them to develop any meaningful 
cognitive skills to that end. Enthusiasm for more academic aspects of the legal 
profession can be snuffed out without students and lecturers even being aware of it. 
This is not only detrimental to research departments at universities, but for society 
in general. The fewer talented lawyers have obtained the skills to critically analyse 
and evaluate legislation and the legal system as such, the harder it will become to 
find people who will be able to create law to encompass new solutions for new legal 
issues and challenges in the future. 
 
The second reason why poorly honed critical thinking on the part of law students is 
problematic ties into this. In the past, the mechanical application of law to facts only 
made academically-inclined students worse off (mostly because of – in their minds 
– dull seminars). In the (very near) future, however, practically-inclined students will 
be much worse off than before. The ability to mechanically apply law to facts is 
rapidly becoming obsolete in a world driven by Artificial Intelligence (Van 
Oostrom-Streep, 2016; Van Klink et al., 2017). Do-it-yourself platforms that 
generate legal documents and tailor-made advice through interactive questionnaires 
are overtaking a large part of the legal profession. Consumers can find legal 
information more easily without a lawyer, because of the possibilities that artificial 
intelligence offers. DoNotPay, for example, is an online robot lawyer via an 
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application that can help individuals with law disputes in more than a thousand 
different legal areas (see for a short introduction 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PHZobnM2wlw).  
 
Another example is ROSS. ROSS is an advanced artificial intelligent system that 
gives precise answers to legal questions. The consumer can pose their question 
online, as if talking to a lawyer, and receives pin-pointed answers from published 
and unpublished case law within seconds (see http://rossintelligence.com/). This is 
not to say that lawyers, judges or legal scholars are becoming obsolete. Artificial 
Intelligence can search through case law, but cannot (yet) think critically, evaluate 
the law or even give an answer to a case that has not yet been discussed in case law. 
The added value of hiring an academically-educated lawyer is to be found in having 
that lawyer be able to perform tasks that artificial intelligence cannot (Ahsmann, 
2018). These are exactly the types of higher-order thinking skills – analysing, 
evaluating existing law, offering proposals for new law – that are currently 
underdeveloped in academically-educated lawyers. 
 
Furthermore, the arrival of the internet calls for a whole new skillset. Many years 
ago, it was not that difficult to keep knowledge of the law up-to-date, because there 
were only a handful of books, magazines and cases to keep up with. Nowadays, it is 
almost impossible to keep track of all legal doctrine and case law. The information 
flow is much larger than before. The handful of offline information has been replaced 
by an (almost) constant overload of online information. An important skill of an 
academically-educated lawyer is to deal with this large flow of information, to 
critically evaluate the information, and to distinguish between primary and 
secondary issues.  
 
This new (digitalised) world therefore calls for an academically-educated lawyer 
with a different mindset and a new cognitive skillset (see also Ahsmann, 2018; 
Elzinga, 2018; Van Klink et al., 2017). Again, he or she needs to have well-
developed higher-order thinking skills (as categorised by Bloom’s taxonomy, Bloom 
1956), such as being critical, being able to analyse, discuss and argue, etc. Though 
it has been clear for many years in educational science that a passive transmission of 
knowledge is not the best way of reaching higher-order cognitive learning objectives 
(e.g. Kanselaar, 2002), legal education has been slow to address this (Stolker, 2013; 
Van Oostrom-Streep, 2016). We believe it is now incumbent upon legal educators 
to, more than ever before, experiment with new forms of education so as to meet the 
prospective challenges facing our students. Academic legal education is the 
foundation for the future careers of students, regardless of whether they become 
lawyers, judges or legal scholars. In order to make seminars more valuable and 
rewarding to both students and lecturers, much more time should be spent on 
developing higher-order thinking skills that cannot be performed by Artificial 
Intelligence. 
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PILOT PROJECT IN TWO COURSES 
 
To achieve these goals, we have implemented a number of changes in two courses 
that are part of the law degree at our Faculty of Law in the Netherlands. First, 
together with a few colleagues, we ran a pilot project in a major third-year Bachelor’s 
degree course (11 ECTS). With the positive results of this project, we decided to also 
make changes in a fourth-year Master’s degree course (7 ECTS). Both courses are 
in the field of property law, so more or less the same lecturers were involved.  
 
 
The third-year course: ‘Burgerlijk recht I’ 
 
Approximately six hundred students were enrolled in the third-year mandatory 
course on property law. We adapted portions of the course within the parameters of 
the Bachelor’s degree curriculum, meaning that the number of credits remained the 
same, as did the schedule and the obligation within our faculty for Bachelor’s degree 
students to attend and prepare seminars. The course lasted thirteen weeks, with two 
lectures and one seminar every week. In the lectures, all students were taught 
simultaneously, while the seminars were conducted in groups of thirty students. The 
lectures retained their traditional format and focused on one-sided knowledge 
transfer. 
 
In the pilot project, we aimed to modify the way the seminars were held to stimulate 
the exercise of higher-order thinking skills. Our ideas originated from a brainstorm 
session, in which we pooled our ideas on an ideal education through seminars, 
considered how we could bring that about and what incentives might be required. In 
hindsight, we recognised that the changes we implemented were loosely based on 
Dochy’s HILL-model (Dochy et al., 2016) and on the theories of constructivism (see 
Kanselaar, 2002) and self-determination (see Ryan & Deci, 2000).  
 
Law is traditionally viewed as a field of study that attracts students that want to 
obtain an academic degree, but have no specific interest in the subject (cf. Stolker, 
2013). Therefore, it is our impression that many students lack intrinsic motivation 
for this mandatory course. We therefore tried to create a sense of urgency (cf. first 
building block of Dochy’s HILL-model), by working on realistic, but largely fictive 
cases and case files, which nevertheless draw from true cases. By dealing with cases 
that students may actually encounter in their later professional lives, we tried to 
stimulate the students’ curiosity and motivation. 
 
The assignments and cases that are covered in seminars, are also often deliberately 
‘fuzzy’ and give rise to discussions; following a certain position (what would the 
student’s argument be if they were an attorney of Party A?); or to weighing up the 
‘pros and cons’ of arguments. ‘Grey areas’ are also included in assignments. This 
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not only helps to develop students’ analytical and critical thinking skills, but also 
help them grasp the necessity of studying not only for the upcoming examination, 
but to truly attempt to thoroughly comprehend and process the issue at hand, and 
benefit later in life from the skills one develops through this process. This also 
enabled students to practice skills that a lawyer needs; such as filtering relevant facts 
from a sea of irrelevant information that is provided by a client or in court, and noting 
that certain information is missing and needs to be provided before a 
recommendation or solution can be presented. In the past, students would usually 
only be provided with the relevant facts, and all the facts they need to solve a case. 
The answer could almost be logically derived from this, and there was only one 
correct answer. In the new design, however, students experience that multiple 
perspectives on a single problem are possible and are encouraged to be creative in 
their solutions and make the links to other issues.  
 
Secondly, we place greater responsibility on the students to practice and develop the 
desired academic skills and stimulate deep processing. True learner agency (refer to 
the second building block of Dochy’s HILL-model) cannot be fully achieved under 
the conditions law is presently taught at our university. Many courses are 
compulsory, because certain courses within the law degree are required to practice 
law and become an attorney at law (advocaat) later on (‘civiel effect’, see for 
discussions also Ahsmann, 2018; Soeharno & Winter, 2018). The number of 
compulsory courses is therefore large, and consequently, the number of optional 
courses are limited. Within this framework, we encouraged students to think for 
themselves and formulate their own opinions and possible answers, instead of 
turning to us for answers to their questions. Lecturers adopted the role of moderators 
and asked students open-ended questions without immediately classifying the 
answer that the students gave as ‘right’ or ‘wrong’. The goal was to allow the 
students to reach a conclusion themselves, with only minimal steering in the right 
direction by the lecturer. Occasionally, we put students to work in groups on a similar 
but slightly different problem to the prepared one, to encourage them to practice their 
higher-order thinking skills. We also asked them to hand in a short text or prepare a 
presentation on the subject. To do this properly, it was necessary for students to be 
well prepared for the seminar. In accordance with the theory of constructivism and 
the fifth building block of Dochy’s HILL-model, we stopped giving ‘mini lectures’ 
during seminars and refrained from summarising or repeating what was covered in 
that week’s literature or lecture. This stimulates students to actually prepare and 
actively participate, rather than just showing up and receiving the main points and 
answers to cases from their lecturers.  
 
To conclude, we used methods of blended learning (or ‘hybrid learning’; cf. building 
block four of Dochy’s HILL-model), such as recording short videos with an 
explanation on difficult topics, or short, online, formative knowledge tests. This 
opened up more time in seminars for discussion and interaction. Prior to this, we 
were using Blackboard, an older digital learning environment that was relevant at 
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the time – we have now switched to Brightspace – merely to highlight 
announcements about examinations and changes to the schedule, and to make 
PowerPoint presentations available. We were still working with a paper-based 
syllabus. This didn’t match the student’s environment, in which they are constantly 
online on a laptop of smartphone. Most students already brought a laptop to class. 
We therefore decided to get rid of our paper-based syllabus. Our increased use of a 
digital learning environment, combined with the aforementioned fictive cases and 
case files made it easier for us to change the cases and assignments every year, so 
the answers to them could no longer be found online. 
 
 
Fourth-year Master’s degree course: ‘Goederenrecht verdiept’ 
 
The fourth-year optional Master’s degree course used to consist of around twelve 
weekly seminars. Approximately sixty students are enrolled on each course intake, 
so two parallel seminars were held. Those seminars consisted partly of explanations 
by the lecturer and partly of discussion of cases students had prepared.  
 
Inspired by the success of the pilot in the third year and by the book: ‘What the Best 
College Teachers Do’ by Bain (2004), we turned this course into a project, in which 
the students worked in a team to stimulate student urgency, but also to create a 
‘network’ in which students can learn from each other. 
 
We simulated a law firm, in which the students worked as lawyers. This (simulated) 
law firm was asked by an administrator or liquidator in insolvency for advice on how 
to deal with six issues concerning an insolvent company. These issues are the six 
major themes of property law that were the course’s key topics. The issues are 
realistic, but ‘fuzzy’ and very difficult to solve, given that they involve several 
subtopics, lack a single clear solution, the problem is ‘new’, or because literature is 
divided on the subject, and/or because numerous parties are stakeholders and the 
problem demands a very high level of abstraction and analysis. The administrator’s 
role was played by one of our colleagues, who also works as an administrator and 
liquidator in bankruptcies.  
 
The course kicked off with three lectures that do not touch upon the case, but in 
which some general concepts and principles of property law were discussed to assist 
the students in solving the case. After that, six seminars were held. The students that 
enrolled in the course, were divided into two main groups. Within the group, the 
students formed six teams. Each team was assigned one of the themes and was 
responsible for the seminar on ‘their’ topic. We provided no literature or case law, 
just as in real-life. The team did research on the problem and presented their tentative 
conclusion in the seminar to the rest of the class, just as if it was a meeting at the law 
firm, in order to update the responsible partner on the case and request input. During 
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this presentation, the students of the other teams were requested to ask questions and 
comment on the presented conclusion. The lecturer had a supporting role and 
remained out of the students’ way as much as possible during the first half of the 
seminar. During the second half of the seminar, the lecturer assumed a more active 
role and was devoted to clarifications and summarising what the team had found, 
and pointing out logical ‘gaps’ in their reasoning, if they hadn’t already recognised 
them, the goal being to find solutions to these gaps through class discussion. 
 
After the seminar, the team made references to the relevant literature they found and 
case law available to the other students on Brightspace. The teams were encouraged 
to put their recommendation to the administrator on paper, taking into account the 
feedback they received during the seminar. The teams were encouraged to hand it 
in, so the lecturer could provide even more feedback. In a final meeting, each team 
pitched their final recommendation in a short presentation to the administrator, who 
was present and asked additional critical questions or offered comments on whether 
the proposed solution would be feasible in practice. A professor who wasn’t 
previously involved in the project was also present as an expert to discuss.  
  
Students were asked to commit to participation in the seminar. The seminars were 
not compulsory, but once they committed to participation, they were expected to be 
present for the entire course and could not let their team down. The exam was open 
book and consisted of two essay questions on new topics, in which students could 
show they now possessed the higher-order thinking skills to solve new complex and 
‘fuzzy’ problems on their own. 
 
 
OUTCOME – POSITIVE RESULTS 
 
The evaluations of the pilot projects (based on surveys and discussions with students) 
are promising. They show that student engagement and interest in the subject matter 
have improved and additional self-study hours were invested in the course. That is a 
huge improvement, because legal education isn’t about learning a simple trick that 
can be applied to any case, it’s about investing time in the matter to develop the 
higher-order thinking skills, including critical thinking, being capable of analysis, 
discussion and debate. These are all skills students must have to be a successful 
lawyer, judge or legal scholar in this new technology-filled world. More engaged 
students allowed us to spend more time on practicing those desired skills and 
increase test difficulty accordingly. 
 
Related to the previous: students seem to be more actively involved with the material 
and we achieved more interaction and discussion in the seminars at a higher level 
than before. In the third-year course, students surprised us by asking highly pertinent 
questions in seminars and highlighting weak spots in reasoning in legal literature or 
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case law. We believe a lot of the students were able to acquire a more critical stance 
towards the law and took responsibility for their own learning. 
 
We learned that when students are challenged, they can truly develop themselves as 
academically adept lawyers. For example, in the Master’s degree course, we 
expected the students to solve the part of the (very difficult) case that was assigned 
to their team up to 70% on their own. However, as it turned out, the teams were 
mostly able to solve the case to around 95%, only requiring the lecturer’s help with 
the very last part. The pilot projects truly placed the onus for the students’ learning 
process with the students. Again, the Master’s degree course may serve as an 
example: students were encouraged to ask the coordinating lecturer of the course for 
help whenever they got stuck in preparing their seminar. Several teams actually did 
this, mostly to ascertain whether they were on the right track, which they usually 
were, so our job as lecturers was mostly confirming that a certain issue was indeed 
tricky and encouraging them to keep doing what they were doing. In short, the 
students developed a more academic mindset that befits an academic education. 
 
We expected that the teamwork in the Master’s degree course might prove to be a  
hassle, fearing students may drop out during the course given that it was optional. It 
seems, however, that the warning we gave them at the beginning of the course to 
commit truly worked. About 40 of the 60 students who enrolled actually committed 
themselves to working in the team and there were virtually no dropouts during the 
course.  
 
In hindsight, it might have been better to have started with a first-year course. For a 
lot of students, the ‘regime change’ came as a shock and they had a hard time 
adjusting to it. After all, they were already used to two years of education in ‘the old-
fashioned way’. Some students were used to being able to pass their exams with just 
a cursory knowledge of the law and a mechanical application of this knowledge to a 
fact pattern. Now, they were required to evaluate, analyse and more. Thus, what 
made the projects a success, also proved a pitfall: because the project was initiated 
bottom-up, by lecturers that were committed to the idea and plan, it was successful, 
but, due to the lack of top-down control or supervision, the pilot perhaps did not run 
at the best possible point in the curriculum. We also encountered a lot of resistance 
by students because a necessary consequence of the changes is that we needed to put 
the students to work much more than they were used to. 
 
 
OUTCOME - CHALLENGES 
 
Some challenges remain, including on a more fundamental level. First of all, the 
changes caused much insecurity among the students; they felt insecure about their 
preparation for the written exam, since the seminars were so different from what they 
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were used to in previous years and the exam was adjusted to the new learning 
objectives. We tried to overcome this by reassuring students that the exam would be 
comparable to the level of the seminars. In the year following the pilot, we used old 
exam questions for the students to practice with as examples. Still, our impression is 
that students – perhaps because of their experience in taking exams in other courses 
– are more focused on reproducing knowledge, even though we explained, and it is 
clear from the practice exam that it is impossible to pass the exam in this way. 
Evaluations also show that many students fail to grasp the importance of developing 
and practicing the higher-order thinking skills. This may be another reason why they 
stick to the security provided by having a lot of knowledge and why they are focused 
on getting the right answer from the lecturer, instead of trusting their own and each 
other’s capabilities. How can we best deal with the insecurity the focus on skills 
instead of knowledge generates among students? How can we make students feel 
comfortable with the ambiguities of the law? 
 
A more important – but closely related – challenge is how to make sure we do not 
‘lose’ a great number of the students along the way, due to the high demands we 
place on them. The focus on the higher-order skills has increased the level of the 
courses and not all students are capable of keeping up with that. How should we deal 
with students who have difficulty adapting to a more free-flowing learning 
environment? We are still working out how we can best help the students that are 
struggling. How can we actively train the desired skills in students to whom these 
skills do not come naturally? 
 
A related challenge is that of motivation and preparation. In order to be able to 
practice the skills in seminar, students need to prepare and take responsibility for 
laying the knowledge foundation necessary to be able to discuss, debate, evaluate, 
etc. Although, in general, we believe students are better prepared for seminars than 
before, ill-prepared students certainly remain. We are under the impression that 
especially students who are in the ‘danger zone’, often fail to prepare for class (in 
the right way) or focus primarily on knowledge. Because the format of having 
students presenting the cases and assignments to each other in groups worked so well 
in the Master’s degree course, we implemented the same in the third-year course last 
year. This was the third year the course was taught along these new lines. This 
seemed to work very well. However, we did encounter two challenges. First of all, 
(and this is also something we are struggling with in the Master’s degree course) 
having the students prepare a presentation works very well for the students who are 
to present that week. But how do we get the other students, the audience so to say, 
to be actively involved as well? Secondly, when rehearsing exam questions halfway 
the course, we noticed that students hadn’t mastered the skills after all. Only after 
rehearsing the problem, so going through the problem a second time, the penny 
seemed to finally drop. Unfortunately, we do not have the means to practice 
everything with students twice. That is exactly why we expect students to prepare 
themselves, by attending the lecture, reading the relevant literature, taking the 
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formative knowledge test, watching short clips on the subject, doing the assignment 
for themselves, among other good habits. How do we motivate students to actually 
do this and make the most effective use of seminar time? 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Several developments gave reason to adjust two academic courses with the objective 
of enabling students to develop higher-order thinking skills. We believe that students 
should be able to not only apply the law in a specific situation, but, for example, also 
to critically reflect on the underlying norms. Being able to remember, understand 
and (mechanically) apply the law can hardly be called academic. Furthermore, this 
skill is becoming rapidly obsolete in a world driven by Artificial Intelligence. This 
development calls for an academically-educated lawyer with a different mindset and 
a new cognitive skillset. To help students achieve this new mindset and skillset, we 
have implemented a number of changes in two courses that are part of the law degree 
at our Faculty of Law in the Netherlands. The two courses (on property law) 
functioned as pilot projects.  
 
In short, we modified the way the seminars were held to stimulate practice of these 
higher-order reasoning skills. We tried to stimulate the students’ curiosity and 
motivation by working on realistic, but largely fictive cases and casefiles or by even 
simulating a law firm. Furthermore, we asked students to solve ‘fuzzy’ problems that 
give rise to discussions, we placed greater responsibility on the students to practice 
and develop the desired academic skills and we used methods of blended learning. 
In hindsight, we recognised that the changes we implemented were loosely based on 
Dochy’s HILL-model and on the theories of constructivism and self-determination. 
 
The evaluations of the pilot projects are promising. Students are well prepared for 
class, actively involved and we achieved more interaction and discussion at a higher 
level than before. Students can truly develop themselves as academically adept 
lawyers, they just need to be challenged. We are convinced that strong teamwork has 
greatly contributed to the success of the project. Everyone in the team of lecturers 
acknowledged the importance of the goal and strived to achieve the objective that 
had been set. Of course, some challenges remain. Presumably, the challenges we 
meet are inherent to education in general. They continue to receive our attention. By 
continuously evaluating and finetuning the design of the course and the seminars we 
strive to help the students reach the higher-order learning objectives in the best 
possible way, given the parameters of the curriculum. Overall, we believe the result 
of the changes is very positive and we are more certain than ever that this is the way 
to go.  
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